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According to situated, embodied, and distributed approaches to cognition, language is
a crucial means for structuring social interactions. Recent approaches that emphasize
this coordinative function treat language as a system of replicable constraints on
individual and interactive dynamics. In this paper, we argue that the integration of
the replicable-constraints approach to language with the ecological view on values
allows for a deeper insight into processes of meaning creation in interaction. Such
a synthesis of these frameworks draws attention to important sources of structuring
interactions beyond the sheer efficiency of a collective system in its current task situation.
Most importantly, the workings of linguistic constraints will be shown as embedded
in more general fields of values, which are realized on multiple timescales. Because
the ontogenetic timescale offers a convenient window into the emergence of linguistic
constraints, we present illustrations of concrete mechanisms through which values may
become embodied in language use in development.
Keywords: distributed cognition, embodied cognition, values, language as social coordination, language
development, dynamical systems
INTRODUCTION
Recent research on language has made it increasingly clear that treating it as an individual
computational skill (regardless of whether it is guided by innate or learned rules) is not conductive
to explaining its crucial inter-individual coordinative functions. Language both distributes
cognition, assigning specific roles to interaction participants, and coordinates individual resources,
pooling them in task- and situation-specific synergies (Ra˛czaszek-Leonardi and Cowley, 2012;
Fusaroli et al., 2014). An explanatory framework that encompasses this coordinative property
must show how linguistic structures become functionally related to the ongoing individual and
interactive dynamics of action and co-action. One of the approaches that has been proposed to
account for this coordinative function, which is rooted in early theories of information in biological
systems, rests on treating linguistic structures not as carriers of meaning but rather as constraints—
which, due to their selected controlling role, are able to influence existing dynamics (Pattee and
Ra˛czaszek-Leonardi, 2012).
Earlier work within this framework has underscored the functional pressures that shape
coordinative systems through linguistic constraints to be efficient in specific tasks (Ra˛czaszek-
Leonardi and Kelso, 2008; Fusaroli et al., 2012; Ra˛czaszek-Leonardi, 2014; Zubek et al., under
review). The goal of this paper is to show that the sources of constraints cannot be limited to the
sole efficiency of a distributed system in dealing with immediate situations. Using the ecological
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approach to cognition (Gibson, 1966, 1979) and value-realizing
theory (Hodges and Baron, 1992; Hodges and Geyer, 2006;
Hodges, 2014; Hodges et al., 2014), we will show that language
is not only a form of functional, task-oriented coupling but
also, or perhaps above all, a value-realizing activity using value-
preserving structures.
To realize this goal, we will briefly present the approach to
language as a system of replicable constraints, which has been
developed on the grounds of information theory in biological
systems proposed by Howard Pattee, among others. Next, to
deepen and broaden this approach, we will turn to the work of
Gibson on affordances, developed further by Hodges and Baron
(1992), in which the authors show the fundamental role of values
in psychological theory. We will briefly present their proposal of
how to avoid strictly mechanistic (law-like) or strictly algorithmic
(rule-like) accounts of human behavior by considering a more
general value-realization frame.
The two theories together will provide a background for
demonstrating that linguistic constraints emerge in such a way as
to preserve both general systemic values (such as efficiency and
coherence) and culturally selected values (such as, e.g., specific
social structure). Uncovering the processes through which
linguistic expressions are endowed with value-preserving and
controlling power over interaction requires attention to processes
on several distinct timescales (e.g., on-line, developmental, and
cultural and biological evolution). Here we will focus on the
developmental timescale to show, through a microanalysis of
instances of language use in mother-infant interaction, the
ways in which such value-preserving constraining powers might
arise. Conclusions concern the usefulness of such a framework
in systematizing the complex interplay of forces in linguistic
coordination and guiding the search for both important values
that may be present in interaction and mechanisms through
which they are preserved.
LANGUAGE AS A SYSTEM OF
CONSTRAINTS CONTROLLING SOCIAL
INTERACTION
In recent years, language has increasingly been treated as
primarily a sophisticated mean of social coordination. On such
view, the “mapping” or referential function of language for an
individual mind with respect to the world becomes less important
than, or subservient to, its role in controlling collective systems
formed through human interaction (Ra˛czaszek-Leonardi and
Cowley, 2012). This change in views on language is a part of
the broader shift in the theory of cognition: from considering
it as a form of solitary information-processing by an individual
mind/brain to regarding it primarily as a basis for embodied,
situated, distributed and adaptive action.
This interactive and collective dimension of language
functioning, pertaining to the coordination of global systems
(such as dyads, groups, and societies) over longer timescales,
must be integrated with more local and individual skills that lead
to language production and understanding. Recent years have
seen several attempts to clarify the relations among the multiple
systems and multiple timescales relevant to language, both in
empirical studies of language and in computational simulations
of emergent linguistic structuring and human performance
(Smith et al., 2003; Van Orden et al., 2003; Ra˛czaszek-Leonardi,
2010; Wallot and Van Orden, 2011a,b; Dale and Lupyan, 2012).
Such frameworks seem to provide a broader repertoire of
useful explanatory concepts that can be applied to emergent
language structures, the manner in which they are learned, and
their functioning in interaction. Traditional cognitive models
locate the forces responsible for linguistic behaviors or linguistic
structures within the mental machinery of an individual, but in
the embodied, situated and distributed approaches, the sources
of the forces are many. These forces arise from the requirements
of stability, functionality and learnability of the system, shaped in
multiple interactions over various periods of time.
Thus, one problem for theories of language within such a
coordinative framework is its complexity, its dependence on
processes on multiple timescales and within various systems.
However, an even more pressing issue concerns the relation
between informational (“symbolic”) structures and the multiple
dynamical events that contribute to individual cognition and
action as well as inter-individual interactive processes. In other
words, in the framework where the controlling role of language
becomes at least equally important as the referential one, the
relation between the symbolic and dynamic aspects of language
has to go beyond the traditional “mapping” relationship.
One of the approaches that has been developed specifically to
address this problem has grown out of theories of information
in biological systems. Following work in philosophy of biology
(Polanyi, 1968; Pattee, 1969, 1982), this framework treats
informational structures as replicable constraints that render
various kinds of dynamics functional in a given environment by
reducing selected degrees of freedom of an active system. Within
this approach, physical informational structures are inseparable
from dynamical events on many timescales: they arise from them
and they are selected to have a controlling role with respect to
them (e.g., Pattee, 1969, 1982).
This approach, as applied to natural language, has been
presented in detail elsewhere (Pattee and Ra˛czaszek-Leonardi,
2012; Ra˛czaszek-Leonardi, 2014). To briefly restate its main
tenets, let us underscore the change it brings to the nature of
linguistic structures: they become informational not because they
map onto content in the mind or objects and events in the
world but because they have a constraining role, which renders
the coordination of individuals appropriate and flexible under
environmental demands. This constraining role is established
through selection during a particular history of the inter-
individual coordination in a given environment and within
a given culture. Such a perspective underscores the fact that
language consists of physical events, having a causal role with
respect to the dynamics of action or co-action. However, the
crucial aspect of this role is not only that it is (physically)
causal but also that it is selective (Ra˛czaszek-Leonardi, in
press): due to its history within a system, an informational
structure evolves as a specific constraint, which is able to bind
selected degrees of freedom to render the behavior of the system
adaptive.
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The study of linguistic structures is thus best carried within
dynamics of interaction, i.e., in their “natural habitat” (Schegloff,
1996). The interactive dimension of linguistic processes comes
to the fore. The systemic-level qualities can be the substrate for
selection of useful structures in their own right (Smaldino, 2014).
Utterances are informational because they have been selected in
cultural evolution to influence interactions in a particular way
and because individuals learn to perceive them and use them as
effective controls.
There is a strong compatibility between such a view on the
informative properties of linguistic structures and the approach
to perception and action within ecological psychology. According
to this approach, aspects of the environment are informational
because organisms are tuned to them in evolution, development
and experience in a way that selectively constrains their actions
(i.e., these aspects of the environment become affordances).
In a similar way, language can be considered a system of
interactional affordances, directly perceived as opportunities
for action, enabling interaction by mutually constraining the
participants (Worgan and Moore, 2010; Ra˛czaszek-Leonardi
et al., 2013; Ra˛czaszek-Leonardi, in press).
So far, however, according to views of language as social
coordination, including the replicable-constraints framework,
the efficiency of coordination seemed to be the most important,
if not the only, decisive factor for the selection of controlling
structures. The application of such frameworks in empirical
research most often concerned task-oriented dialogues, with
quantitative measures of performance on the task serving as
indices of “good” or “successful” communication (e.g., Fusaroli
et al., 2012). A major concern arises that such an emphasis might
lead to a mechanistic and simplistic view of the coordinative role
of language.
Many traditional, functionally oriented approaches to
language underscored that the immediate functional or
informative role of language is but one aspect of its social
and coordinative role (Linell, 2009; Goodwin, 2013). The
fields of language socialization, conversation analysis and
ethnomethodology have traditionally focused on uncovering
not only what is achieved within interaction but also how it is
achieved. Contributions in the field have revealed how social
organization is constructed (and preserved) not only through
the use of linguistic resources but also through patterns of
body alignment, gaze, and prosody (e.g., Goodwin and Cekaite,
2013). An extensive amount of work has been devoted to
understanding how social relationships are constituted within
everyday interaction and language use (e.g., Goodwin, 1990;
Stivers et al., 2011; Enfield, 2013; Lindström and Sorjonen, 2013)
and how values, ideologies and socialization goals inform ways
of interacting (e.g., De León, 2000; for a collection see Duranti
et al., 2012). These analyses of multiple social “agendas” in
communication depict language as a constitutive element of
social practice, which preserves social structures and a mode of
preservation of social order.
By taking social action as the main analytic objective, these
approaches are especially powerful when considering language in
the developmental timescale (Wootton, 2005; Kidwell, 2013; see
also Gardner and Forrester, 2010). The functioning of language
in development is perhaps a particularly vivid example of how
rich the role of language is in social coordination, making
evident the multiple aspects of coordination that language might
influence. Through linguistic interactions, a child learns not
only how to name things (which seems to have been the
main emphasis of research in the past several decades, e.g.,
Golinkoff et al., 1994; Smith et al., 2002) and how to direct
attention to others and objects but also—crucially—how to
enter interactions. This includes learning how to adapt to a
communication partner through temporal matching of activity
level, facial expressions, and properties of vocalizations (Stern,
1974, 1985; Trevarthen, 1979; Beebe et al., 1982; Papoušek and
Papoušek, 1989; Leimbrink, 2010) and how to keep a common
rhythm of speech and action (Jaffe et al., 2001). It also includes
learning to be a part of a distributed system, i.e., learning
about possible roles that the child can take on in common
endeavors (Gratier et al., 2015; Nomikou et al., under review);
learning to expect and project unfolding sequences of actions in
common endeavors (Heller and Rohlfing, 2015); and stabilizing
conventionalized social routines (Strähle, 2013).
The role of very early linguistic interactions is thus not the
practical efficiency of a given co-action (e.g., getting a child
dressed or fed), nor it is the assumed “endpoint” of language
learning which, by some accounts, consists in mapping linguistic
structures to the external world. Language, from an early age,
takes on a role of subtle interaction control, shaping interactions
into socially acceptable coordinative systems, and as studies
analyzing talk-in-interaction show (Ochs et al., 1996), it remains
so in the adult world. The question arises: how to introduce this
richness into the framework of language as a system of replicable
constraints to save it from the view of mechanistic functionality?
How can one introduce criteria that make interactive human
systems stable and coherent in the long run, as parts of broader
environment-organism systems? In other words, an integrated
theory should account for the fact that social coordinative
systems are not only devices, realizing “functions” but also self-
sustaining systems in a particular niche, which is a crucial source
of the values to be realized.
A FRAMEWORK FOR MULTIPLE-VALUES
REALIZATION
The long-term integrity of a system in the face of environmental
challenges, apart from current functionality, is thus an obvious
candidate for another value realized on many timescales. It can
be in conflict with the value of immediate efficiency, because,
for example, it may promote sameness in participants when
divergence would be more functional. How linguistic constraints
function in this broader field of values, and what the role of
values is in shaping these constraints, can be better understood
by reaching deeper into the theoretical resources of ecological
psychology, which, among very few approaches in scientific
psychology, has sought to give values an important place in its
explanatory framework. If linguistic constraints indeed arise in a
similar way as affordances, by developing and tuning sensitivities
to directly pick up what they specify (Ra˛czaszek-Leonardi et al.,
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 3 October 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 1579
Ra˛czaszek-Leonardi and Nomikou Beyond mechanistic interactions
2013), then, similarly to affordances, they are saturated with
values, and their direct apprehension enables value realization.
Ecological psychology has always shown sensitivity to the
social and moral dimensions of organisms acting in the world,
both in its beginnings (e.g., Gibson and Crooks, 1938) and
especially in its later developments toward social ecological
psychology (e.g., Hodges and Baron, 1992). Criticizing traditional
approaches to psychology (both the behaviorist and the
information-processing paradigms), Ed Reed wrote:
“To the extent that our psychologies ever deal with important
issues of value or meaning, they are nonnaturalistic, or even
downright non-scientific. Conversely, to the extent that they have
been scientific, our psychologies have had little or nothing to say
about meaningful aspects of life.”
Reed (1996 p. 96).
One of the goals of the ecological approach to psychology was
to preserve both scientific rigor and the possibility of referring
to meaning and values to move toward socially responsible
science (Hodges and Baron, 1992). Gibson, moving away from a
“psychology of the stimulus,” sought to frame organisms as active,
value-realizing parts of the world instead of stimulus-driven
information processors.
In a seminal paper, James J. Gibson and L. E. Crooks analyzed
an everyday action, driving a car, from the perspective of the field
of forces that motivate its ultimate outcome. We usually think
about such activities as determined by the physical properties
of objects, artifacts and surroundings, as well as by the set of
conventional rules of traffic regulations, meanwhile overlooking
other powerful and pervasive constraints. A car will be stopped
by a person standing on the road: this will not be due to an
arbitrary rule (as in the case of stopping at a red light), nor will it
be the result of physical laws that impede motion (as in the case
of encountering a brick wall) (Hodges and Baron, 1992).
What Gibson and Crooks have shown is that during the act
of driving, multiple values are simultaneously realized, which
stem neither from the physics of the situation nor from codified
rules, but which influence the direct pickup of information from
the environment. For example, the seemingly straightforward
time-to-contact estimation seems to be strongly influenced by
individual differences in valuing safety. Other values—such as
speed, accuracy, trust in others and in infrastructure, and respect
for other users of the road—are also present in driving. Note
that almost all of these values are social; that is, they depend on
relations to others, which makes driving a rather bad example of
a solitary activity, something it is often thought to be (Gibson and
Crooks, 1938). Gibson therefore was after “meaning and value of
a new sort.” Objects are defined in terms of “ecological physics,”
not “physical physics,” as they “possess meaning and value to
begin with” (Gibson, 1979). Due to way perceptual systems evolve
and are tuned through experience, “‘values’ and ‘meanings’ of
things in the environment can be directly perceived” (Gibson,
1979, p. 127), not requiring complex mental machinery and
extensive explicit knowledge.
In their 1992 paper, Hodges and Baron further developed
arguments for the importance of values in ecological psychology,
linking it more firmly to the agenda and traditions of social
psychology. Congruently with Gibson’s approach (and unlike
most traditional approaches to social and moral psychology),
they also do not place values in a mentally represented system
of rules. Values, they claim, seem to be more law-like than rules,
yet also more rule-like than laws. They are not laws because
they are not as unavoidable and unintentional as laws: there is
a (slight) choice as to which value to follow if multiple values are
in conflict. They are not rules, either, because rather than being
mental constructs, values can be picked up directly in the act of
perception. They are enacted and embodied in social practices
and artifacts, and they directly specify actions. Thus, values are
also more obligatory than rules, which are easy to break, as they
usually overdetermine behavior (e.g., “keep quiet!”), and they
appear where there is a real choice of behaviors.
Both lawful (in terms of “ecological physics”) and rule-
following behavior should be seen as “nested within a psychology
of values.” The public and perceivable values are not just
“appended” to a lawfully functioning system (Turvey, 1977, after
Hodges and Baron, 1992) but rather permeate every available
affordance. Perception is therefore veridical about utilities,
possibilities and values, and only together do these properties
become affordances.
Omnipresent, Transparent, Biasing
Hodges and Baron point to the omnipresence of values
and their realization in deeds, ways of behaving, social and
cultural customs, habitat arrangements, and artifacts. They quote
Valsiner’s (1987) research on socialization at mealtime and
interpret it in terms of value-realization. Not only the customs
at table—the culturally appropriate use of dishes and cutlery
that the child learns—but also the designs of tables and artifacts
embody a multiplicity of values. The values range from safety
and economy in using resources to maintaining proper social
relations (e.g., by a child’s being seated on a highchair to
make him or her appear “equal” to others) to comfort and
physical convenience. These values are constantly in tension and
constantly renegotiated. This also means that the child must be
given freedom to explore and test boundaries.
An interesting observation is that the design of objects used
at the table makes their “proper” means of use easier. Thus,
values are also present in the shapes of objects (for example,
the shape- and weight-balance of cups, which afford drinking
and repositioning without spills). The remaining freedom allows
the child to learn that she can be an agent, which leads
to the realization of other values, such as responsibility. The
child’s caregivers are thus neither passive observers nor active
feeders; rather, they allow the child to make choices to navigate
convenient and acceptable ways of acting.
Let us underline again that most of those values are never
made explicit. They are non-conscious and transparent (in the
sense that it is difficult to notice them), pervading the structure
of objects, actions and events, and being enacted unreflectively
together with the child rather than being thought about and
taught overtly. This, as ecological psychologists often note,
makes it tricky to control for them in experiments, as they
are often transparent to researchers, too. The experiment is a
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 4 October 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 1579
Ra˛czaszek-Leonardi and Nomikou Beyond mechanistic interactions
highly structured social situation, and obliviousness to this fact
often skews the interpretations of results. As Van Orden and
Holden wrote: “Any credible research program should begin with
a plausible story of how laboratory protocols yield cooperative
performances” (Van Orden and Holden, 2002, p. 102). For
example, if a participant in an fMRI experiment is asked to tell the
truth 50% of the time and to lie the other 50%, then he is truthful
to the experimenter’s demands when fulfilling this request. Are
we then measuring the neural correlates to an act of “real” lying,
as declared in the goal of the study?Would the participant’s brain
become similarly activated if he were really deceiving the person
with whom he collaborates within the experimental situation?
A great example of discovering the landscape of values that
people bring with them to the laboratory situation, and of
how ignoring them leads to misinterpretation of the results, is
Hodges and Geyer’s reanalysis of the famous Asch “conformity”
experiment (Hodges and Geyer, 2006). The study (Asch, 1956)
required participants to judge the length of a line in the face of
previous, often untruthful, judgments from the group that the
participant was part of, which consisted of the experimenter’s
confederates. The results, which show that people sometimes
misjudge length in accordance with majority opinion, have
usually been interpreted as showing the undesirable conformity
of human beings and their inability to withstand social pressure.
What Hodges and Geyer have shown is that the distribution of
assents and dissents is better seen not as simply compromising
the truth for the sake of conformity, but rather as testifying to
the attempts of preservation of several values beyond that of
“truthfulness.” In this particular experimental setting, in which
a group was repetitively engaged in a common task for an
extended period of time, the coherence of the group was another
very important value. Participants might have maintained this
coherence by assenting to the group’s judgment to communicate
the acknowledgment of its members’ opinions. After all, each
time one communicated the truth to the experimenter (the real
length of the line) in the face of the others’ differing opinion, one
also communicated distrust in the others and a lack of respect for
their judgments. As Hodges writes, the participants in the Asch’s
experiments, complying sometimes with the wrong judgment of
the group, “gave evidence of caring for truth, caring for others
and caring that others care for the truth.” A careful analysis of the
participants’ responses revealed that indeed the majority of the
participants agreed with the erroneous judgments only 25–30%
of the time. What is even more interesting, they distributed their
conforming responses over the trials in such a way as to maintain
a good relationship with the group over time.
Because values are transparent, multiple, and present in
every detectable affordance, linguistic constraints, which are
“manufactured” over the timescale of cultural evolution to
effectuate good coordination, must also incorporate values. What
will be shown next is that by naturally embedding linguistic
structures in embodied interactions over many timescales, the
replicable-constraints approach to languagemight be a useful one
for research on values. It may offer new perspectives on how
this incorporation might happen—that is, on the evolutionary,
cultural and developmental mechanisms that lead to sensible
and value-preserving reductions of degrees of freedom of the
systems that arise from coordination. On the other hand, the
value-realizing theory shows how linguistic constraints are nested
within a more general field of values and through this helps
identify language’s broader ecology.
Seen from this perspective, the timescale of language
acquisition might be particularly interesting for the study of
how dynamics on the individual and interactional levels become
constrained by culturally stabilized ways of co-action and
language use. This perspective allows us to look at this process
as something more than the “acquisition of rules” by a child,
and it will more likely reveal the multiplicity and complexity of
motives for the particular form of interaction to emerge or the
particular structure to stabilize. As Hodges and Baron emphasize:
“Social learning is inevitably moral, in an elementary sense of the
term, and it is probably a mistake first to construct a behavior
theory without reference to social interaction, and then to attach
it only at the end” (Gibson, 1950, p. 155, after Hodges and Baron,
1992).
LINGUISTIC CONSTRAINTS ARE NESTED
WITHIN FIELDS OF VALUES
The replicable-constraints approach to language advances
a complex, history-dependent and systemic ontology of
constraints. These constraints are structures that accrue
controlling powers over interactions within cultural systems
over the timescales of biological and cultural evolution and
development. Values provide more general constraints or fields
in which social systems are embedded (Hodges and Baron, 1992).
Thus, they can be likened to globally acting constraints, or to
boundary conditions of dynamical systems (here: social systems)
within which other constraints emerge (Hodges, 2007).
There are at least three tenets of the constraints approach to
language that make it particularly compatible with the ecological
approach to values. The first one is the systemic and dynamic
view, which sheds light on the place of values and the ways in
which they can be identified. Values influence where and which
constraints will arise to limit the dynamics of a system; they
change the relative probability of one constraint’s being selected
over another. As stated above, this systemic view underscores
a concrete important value that is distinct from efficiency of
coordination in a particular environment: upholding a coherent
system, structured in the process of adaptation to environmental
demands becomes equally essential.
The second tenet is underscoring the importance of
timescales. Doing so may help to show how realization of
the same values may be achieved by different mechanisms,
depending on the systems and timescales to which they pertain.
For example, the value of the stability and coherence of
interactive systems is achieved not only through slowly evolving
mechanisms that influence the shape of our body and ensure
automatic attention to particular properties (such as eyes,
gaze, biological movement, etc.) but also through more rapid
education of action and perception in ontogeny, which helps to
maintain systemic coherence within particular cultural schemes
of co-action. Finally, coherence is maintained in the timescale of
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current behavior by, e.g., moving and speaking in a particular
way, or by conforming sometimes to the opinions of others, as
in the example discussed above.
The third tenet brings attention to the importance of the
physicality, externalization, and replicability of constraints. As
briefly explained above (and in more detail in, e.g., Pattee and
Ra˛czaszek-Leonardi, 2012), the repetitive physical presence of
an utterance (or a written mark) is necessary to maintain and
reenact the causal role of a constraint. The stabilized form of this
reenactment, which depends on the system’s history, integrates
the constraining power of language over slower timescales.
Similarly in the case of values: selective reenactment, along with
the specific “morphology” of behavior, is the main measurable
proof of their presence.
A vivid example of such presence of values in movement (and
of their readability form movement) is Hodges and Lindhiem’s
study on carrying babies as opposed to groceries. The authors
show that people move differently, perceive steps as less steppable
and are more cautious when hopping over gaps when carrying
a baby than when carrying a potato bag. Our body’s movement
reveals to observers the value of what we are carrying (Hodges
and Lindhiem, 2006). The “moral order” is “dramatized and
made salient in everyday practices” (Macnamara, 1991, after
Hodges and Baron, 1992). Again, it is not simple rule following
and rule enforcement that do the trick, as values are not easily
codified and frequently enacted unconsciously. Often it is our
body, and often only after the fact, that tells us that some values
were strongly conflict or that they were violated. As Cuffari
notes, to discover this, we should investigate “underexplored
but highly relevant dimensions of our embodiment, including
bodily protest, dissonance, discomfort, difference, and betrayal”
(Cuffari, 2014, p. 3).
The necessity of a physical manifestation of a value—through
an utterance, a way of uttering, a trajectory of movement, or
through timing in interaction (i.e., in general, through modes
of re-enaction)—draws attention to different possibilities of
identifying and studying values. Reification of a value in the
form of a mental rule does not seem necessary, or indeed
might be detrimental for its investigation. A formalized, codified,
conscious value is no longer a value: it becomes a rule—
less obligatory and easier to break. Thus, rather than guiding
researchers to the study of mental contents, these assumptions
guide them to the microanalyses of interactions, timing and
trajectories of actions and co-actions as well as the forms and
modes of use of artifacts. The theoretical informativeness of such
external manifestations offers a strong hope for the possibility of
measurable variables and a rigorous study of values.
The constraints approach with the above three tenets
(systemicity, timescales and physicality of enactions) may order,
systematize and offer new perspectives on how value-skilled
perception emerges—that is, on how, on different timescales,
values seep into and shape every perception, move, artifact and
niche we construct. The question of the origin of values is
obviously too difficult to tackle here. However, the framework
offers a glimpse of the variety of possible pressures and their
respective timescales: Some of the value constraints arise on
the timescale of biological evolution, stabilized in the shape of
our body, with its intentional form (Merleau-Ponty, 1962) being
“about” its proper relation to the world and to conspecifics.
Others emerge as very basic, inborn mechanisms involved in
orienting to the others, constituting ingredients of “social glue.”
However, still others arise in development as our perception and
behaviors are shaped within interactions in which cultural values
are enacted.
MEANING: IT HAPPENS ALL THE
TIME—AN ILLUSTRATION IN
DEVELOPMENT
The developmental timescale is particularly relevant for
demonstrating how without explicit education, many values are
learned in action and joint action. As already discussed above,
values are materialized not only in the use of linguistic resources
but also in body alignment, timing, gaze, and prosody.
Social scripts are enacted, and proper participation in them is
enforced and reinforced (Ra˛czaszek-Leonardi et al., 2013). The
same is true for language, which is apprehended in interaction.
The affordances of utterances arise in enactments in a value-
preserving way. How language structures are selected and what
they mean thus depends on the invisible network of values that
limit possible choices. Values decide whether particular uses of
language will become interactional affordances and what exactly
they would afford. Grammatical structures may take shape under
the pressure of social structure, which, e.g., influences patterns
of turn-taking, and in turn, those grammatical structures will
uphold and stabilize these patterns (Ochs et al., 1996; Tanaka,
1999).
In the view of language as a system of replicable constraints,
as briefly explained above, linguistic structures accrue their
controlling power over multiple interactions. This requires their
repetitive involvement as parts of structured episodes. After a
history of enactions within a caregiver-infant dyad, an utterance
gains the power to bind certain degrees of freedom of a dyadic
system, making certain behaviors more probable than others.
What is important is that unlike in the traditional views of
language and language acquisition, an utterance is often neither
“pointing to” nor referring to any specific object or action.
The special timing of its production within an interactive
episode, anchored to specific movements in interaction, makes
it effectuate control over it, binding the participants’ behaviors to
a situation and being able to evoke the coordinative pattern when
needed.
In the examples that follow, we illustrate one of the ways
in which values may enter into and modify the perceptual and
behavioral repertoire. The proper ways of coaction involving
language use is shaped under pressure form multiple values, the
efficiency of a coordinative system in the physical world being
only one of them. Another strong source of values is systemic
coherence, by which we mean not only a simple affiliative
coherence but also a socially appropriate one, which preserves the
social structure of the collective over the long term, and which
may influence the perceived structure of a task. Our examples
will also illustrate how values structure interactions in a more
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FIGURE 1 | Video grabs corresponding to Example 1, transcript lines 1 and 2.
“arbitrary” way than laws, leaving more of a choice but, on the
other hand, doing so in a less idiosyncratic, less explicit and less
codified way than rules.
Both examples come from the video corpus of mother-infant
interactions collected in a specific situation involving diaper
changing. For a detailed description of the corpus see Nomikou
and Rohlfing (2011). With the present case analyses we illustrate
the way in which values are being preserved in co-action and
language use and highlight how they are preserved by the
particular timing and structure of movements, vocalizations and
utterances.
Example 1
In this fragment, the mother initiates an utterance in line 1, while
looking down at the infant’s belly as she engages in the diapering
activity (Figure 1a). In line 2, the infant vocalizes before the
mother has concluded her utterance. The mother immediately
interrupts her utterance. She quickly switches her gaze toward
the infant to attend to the infant’s vocalization. She does so
by raising her eyebrows (Figure 1b) and looking at the infant
with an activated face throughout the infant’s two vocalizations.
She then looks back down, returning to the diapering action
(Figure 1c). Her reaction here indicates that she values the
infant’s vocalization as important. Not only does she stop to
“give the floor” to the infant, but her facial expression and gaze
also reveal that she is giving her whole attention to the infant’s
initiative.
1 M: na [du∧](a)
so you
2 I:[<vocalization>(b)
(0.6s) <vocalization>(c)(0.5s)=
=[<vocalization>
In line 3, the mother comments on the infant’s vocalizations,
thus acknowledging them as something worth talking about.
While the mother is speaking, the infant vocalizes in an
overlapping manner (line 4). The mother pauses (line 3)
and acknowledges the vocalization of the infant by engaging
once again in a sudden change in her facial expression
(Figures 2d,e). She again looks at the infant’s face and raises
her eyebrows and opens her mouth, thus being attentive
to the infant’s vocalization (Figure 2d) and reacting with an
expression of astonishment. She then produces a prolonged “oh”
FIGURE 2 | Video grabs corresponding to Example 1, transcript line 3.
while continuing to engage in an exaggerated facial expression
(Figure 2e).
3 M: [erzählst du was?(d) (1.2s) [o::]:h(e)
(0.8s) was=
=erz[ählst denn du] der Mutti (.) hm?
are you telling something?(1.2s)
[o::]:h (0.8s)=
=what are you telling mommy (.) huh?
4 I: [<vocalization>]
Also of interest here is the use of prosody. In line 3, the mother
ends her utterance with a tag question, “huh,” in which she uses
an intonational contrast—namely a rising pitch (see Figure 3)—
making a response from the infant relevant. After a long pause in
line 5, the mother continues her attempt at eliciting a response by
repeating the same intonation pattern (line 6), while in line (10),
she responds to the infant’s vocalization with the same intonation
pattern (Figure 4).
5 (3.2s)
6 M: hm::?
7 (1.1s)
8 I: <vocalization>
9 I: [<vocalization>]
10 M:[hm:::?]
Next, the mother responds to the infant’s vocalization by looming
over the infant and producing a vocalization, which imitates
in quality the vocalizations of the infant. In this part of the
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sequence, the infant’s vocalizations are treated as contributions
to the interaction. By mirroring the infant’s behavior, the
mother is responding in a way that makes the infant’s actions
FIGURE 3 | Pitch curves from Praat. The rising intonation of “huh” in
Example 1 line 3 is marked in red.
FIGURE 4 | Pitch curves from Praat for Example 1. The rising intonation of
the tag question “huh,” which is repeated twice in the mother’s attempt to elicit
and respond to the infant’s vocalization, is marked in red.
“sensible” for the interaction. Here, the turns are constructed
by using the materials the infant provides and then building
upon them. Thus, the infant’s vocalizations have an effect on the
interaction.
Later in the sequence, in line 25, after a relatively long pause
(2.1 s), the infant produces two vocalizations separated by a
short pause. The first of the vocalizations is longer than her
other vocalizations (2.1 s), and it also has a vocalic quality, in
contrast with her other vocalizations in the sequence, which are
mostly consonantal. Figures 5f–h illustrate the mother’s reaction
to this vocalization. In Figure 5f, the mother is looking up to
the infant. In Figure 5g, the mother is intensifying her display
of attentiveness by looming in on the infant and moving her
head forward. In Figure 5h, the mother initiates an upward
half-nod, preparing to say the “aha” that follows in line 26, but she
holds the position for the duration of the vocalization, waiting
for the infant to speak out before she reacts, thus making the
infant’s contribution even more valuable. In line 26, she utters the
prolonged continuer “aha” (eng. “uhum”) and returns to a neutral
position (Figure 5i).
24 (2.1s)
25 I: <vocalization>(f, g)(0.5s)=
=
(h)
<vocalization>
26 M: ah[a]?(i)
From the above fragment, we see that practically all of the
infant’s vocalizations are treated with attention and embedded
in a turn-taking-like structure. What is even more interesting
is that the mother provides such an intense reaction—both in
terms of bodily resources activated and in terms of a prolonged
continuer—to an utterance consisting of vocalic vocalization and
thus more language-like than a consonantal vocalization. This
behavior could thus be an example of how values, or the different
weighing of the repertoire of available resources, might shape
the development of language—in this case, the development
of preverbal vocalizations, which will eventually lead to the
production of words.
The example above dealt predominantly with the proper
structuring of linguistic exchange and with acknowledging the
infant as an active partner in shaping interaction. Agency and
responsibility for actions seem to be frequent values that impinge
FIGURE 5 | Video grabs corresponding to Example 1, transcript lines 25 and 26.
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FIGURE 6 | Video grabs corresponding to Example 2, transcript lines 1 and 3.
FIGURE 7 | Video grabs corresponding to Example 2, transcript lines 5–8.
on and are maintained by the ways of coaction, as illustrated by
the next example.
Example 2
The sequence begins with the infant vocalizing (line 1) and
wiggling his legs. In line 2, the mother pauses abruptly, stands in
front of the changing table and initiates a repair with the word
“what” (see Drew, 1997). At this point, mother and infant are
looking at each other with neutral facial expressions (Figure 6a).
After a pause (line 3), the mother repeats the repair initiator
“what” (line 4). At this point, we can see that both mother and
infant are starting to smile (Figure 6b). In Figure 6c, a fully
developed mutual smile appears, and only then does the mother
return to her activity, by announcing the next action step (line 4).
This sequence makes visible the collaborative construction of the
interaction.
1 I: <vocalization>
2 M: was?(a)
what?
3 (1.5s)
4 M: (b)was?(c) (.) ich zieh mal die hose an
what (.) I will put the pants on
In line 1, the mother cannot interpret the infant’s vocalization.
She initiates a repair, displaying her doubt with a neutral facial
expression, while simultaneously aligning herself with the neutral
expression of the infant. In line 4, mother and infant are
moving to another interactive state; namely, they are initiating
a smile. It seems that it is only when they both reach a point of
producing a big smile that the activity is resumed. This behavior
can be interpreted as a striving for mutual acknowledgment of
participation in interaction.
During the pause in line 5, the infant stretches one leg
(Figure 7d). In line 6, the mother responds to this movement by
asking the infant whether they should start with that particular
leg. She points to and touches that leg in synchrony with
the deictic “this” (Figure 7e). Next in the sequence, the infant
stretches the other leg (line 7, Figure 7f). The mother again
responds with the same pattern, pointing to and touching the
other leg in synchrony with the deictic “this” (Figure 7g).
5 (2.7s)(d)
6 M: mit dem (e)bein?
with this leg?
7 (1.5s)(f)
8 M: oder mit dem (g)bein?
or with this leg?
In this sequence, the infant’s stretched leg is treated as a
proposal and an affordance for the next action sequence.
This instills in the diaper-changing activity the value of it
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FIGURE 8 | Video grabs corresponding to Example 2, transcript lines 13–17.
being a collaborative task in which proposals are made—in
this case, the infant’s leg movements, which are acknowledged
as fully legitimate, “authored” input from the infant to the
co-constructed interactive event. This is made perceivable by
the mother’s verbalizing the action of the infant presented as
questions in lines 6 and 8 and by her synchronizing her speech
with her pointing gesture, providing a tactile sensation to the
deictic expression “this” (see also Nomikou and Rohlfing, 2011)
for an analysis of action-language synchrony).
The mother then takes both legs and pushes them into the
trousers. Having initiated this step of the dressing process, the
mother pauses in line 13 and changes her bodily orientation
and gaze from looking at the infant’s legs to positioning herself
in an upright position in the center of the changing table and
engaging in eye contact with the infant. In this position, she
pauses and waits (Figure 8h). In line 14, the infant vocalizes and
subsequently stretches one leg through the trousers (Figure 8i).
The mother responds by thanking the infant. In line 17, she
grabs the other foot and pulls it through the leg of the trousers
(Figure 8j) and thanks the infant again.
13 (2.8s)(h)
14 I: <vocalization>
15 M: (i)danke?
thank you?
16 (1.8s)
17 M: u::nd? (1s) dan(j)ke?
a::nd? (1s) thank you?
This part of the sequence again illustrates the way in which
the mother invites the infant to participate in the diapering
activity. She pauses and creates slots for the infant’s contribution
(see also Ra˛czaszek-Leonardi et al., 2013), at the same time
reenacting culturally specific patterns—namely, saying “thank
you” to another person for giving you something. The interesting
detail in this sequence is that the mother says “thank you” in
spite of the fact that she executes the action herself. Here, she
is repeating the interactive pattern as if the infant had offered
something, instilling again the value of collaboration and agentive
participation.
Through multiple repetitions of situations like the ones above,
utterances can be selectively linked to a specific constellation
of aspects of the behavior of a speaker and a listener and of
the situation they are immersed in. Thus, learning consists in
the mother “moving” the baby into a cultural episode that
she is enacting, and then, as the child begins to actively
participate, in reinforcing proper joint actions. The value-
realizing aspect of this process that we emphasize in this
paper manifested themselves in those efforts made toward
structuring the episode that seem persistent yet unnecessary
and superfluous from the point of view of the sheer efficiency
of a collective system in a given task (e.g., changing a diaper,
dressing).
These illustrations pertain to the “enigmatic” in the quote
recalled in Hodges and Baron: “most episodes cannot be directly
classified: they are enigmatic, having neither an explicit set of
rules nor produced by well-established causal mechanisms” (Harre
and Secord, 1972, p. 12). Early in development, the non-specific
mechanisms for creating a system (such as focusing on face
and gaze following) are in place, yet the more specific values
pertaining to “being together” in a situation (e.g., respecting
each other) and maintaining social order in a particular culture
can be imparted though such co-actions. The infant learns to
co-act within social order in the “ecological way” by tuning
to the actions of others as affordances for value-preserving
actions and not by learning explicit social rules and norms.
This is a possible way to normativity, as congruently with
recent reformulations, social norms are understood as interaction
patterns grounded in situated interpersonal relations (Brinck,
2014).
A question might arise as to the difference between values and
social norms in the framework sketched above. Are caregivers
enforcing social norms, or are the dyadic systems realizing
socially important values? As one of the reviewers noted, what
is expected by a group, culture or person is not necessarily
equivalent to realizing values. Discussion of the difference
between values and norms far exceeds the scope of this paper.
One cannot take the easy way out and distinguish them on the
basis of explicitness or being rule-based (e.g., constitutive rule-
based norms) or more evasive (values). Not all social norms
are formalized and conscious; some are just embodied in the
ways “things are done” in a particular culture/society. From
this perspective, social norms appear as instantiating values in
a socially adequate way—congruent with other instantiations—
choosing from among many possible constraining properties of a
value those that are congruent within the normative system of a
given culture/group.
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CONCLUSIONS
To further develop the framework in which linguistic utterances
are treated as constraints on multisystem and multi-timescale
dynamics—and to demonstrate its compatibility and affinity
with the ecological approach to cognition—we sought to show
the place of values and value-realization in the process of
the emergence and use of linguistic constraints. Although the
language-as-replicable-constraints framework has been useful so
far mostly in task-oriented linguistic interactions, in which it
seems to help in making predictions about the efficiency of
coordinative systems, we hope to have demonstrated that this
task-functionality is not the sole criterion for structure selection
and stabilization. This paper aimed to show that the framework,
far from being functionally mechanistic, inevitably encompasses
multiple value realization by presenting interactions as being
based in affordances.
The systemic approach to language as social coordination,
along with the emphasis on the physical aspect of enacted values
and the notion of timescales, helps to elucidate further the role
of values and to guide the search for them. Some important
values can be seen to stem from the requirements of holding
a structured system together—and thus perhaps more can be
explained by “biological accounts of natural selection” than we
usually think. The mechanisms for preserving and realizing
values through embodiment have been illustrated with examples
from a developmental timescale, in which the behaviors of the
caregiver, which were not directly necessary for the current
activity of a dyad, can be seen as instilling values through the
reenactment of cultural scripts.
The guidelines for the study of values within this “morality-
in-motion” view, point to reading sets of values carefully off of
multiple interactions, which reveal them in a subtle way. In our
examples, these values included acknowledging the participation
of the other in interaction, treating her/him as a responsible and
independent agent, respecting the other’s input, and mutually
acknowledging the structures of interactive episodes, such as
turn-taking. The best sources of data for such analyses seem
to be the natural and quasi-natural situations of collaboration.
Our examples pertained to the developmental timescale, but the
on-line interactive episodes of adults are amenable to similar
types of analysis, and several successful attempts at such analysis
have appeared recently (Pedersen, 2012; Steffensen and Pedersen,
2014).
The above approach enables a deeper insight into the
meanings that are co-created during participation in interactions
by highlighting their embeddedness in larger fields of values. At
the same time, it offers hints as to the values being realized. For
this, however, the coordinative role of language has to come to
the fore, which, in turn, seems better explained if language is
not treated as a tool of “information exchange,” but rather as a
perception-action system, enabling the formation of coherent,
functional and flexible organizations with their own level of
agency.
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